

The 28th Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference

Oslo, Norway, 25 – 27 August 2019

Clean Oceans & the Future of Working Life

Challenges and Visions

Monday, 26 August

FIRST SESSION

Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region

“Peaceful and close neighbourliness as well as intense cooperation based on democratic values, the rule of Law, human rights and equal opportunities for all”

Dr Alexander Graef,

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Check against delivery. Only the speech as given has any validity.

Beyond Deterrence

Regional Stability through Confidence Building and
Arms Control



- State wants to change the status-quo, seeking expansion, regime change or subversion
- Military capabilities are evidence of aggressive behavior



Policy Recommendation

Increase military strength and resolve

- State seeks security within the anarchy of international relations
- Military capabilities are an expression of feeling 'insecure'




Policy Recommendation

Signal benign intentions, change threat perceptions

BSR Security Environment since 2014

Changing military expenditures between 2014 and 2018 (in current USD)



Source: own compilation based on SIPRI, World Bank, 2019

BSR Security Environment since 2014

Increasing Quality of Deployment: NATO

Wales 2014

- ❑ Readiness action plan
- ❑ Very-high readiness joint task force (VJTF) and Integration Units
- ❑ Expanded NATO response force (NRF): 13,000 to 40,000 troops

Warsaw 2016

- ❑ Enhanced forward presence in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland: 4 multinational rotating battalions
- ❑ Tailored forward presence (multinational brigade) in Romania

Brussels 2018

- ❑ Readiness initiative: 4x 30s by 2020
- ❑ Counter-Hybrid Support Teams
- ❑ NATO Command Structure Reform: more personnel, two new commands

❑ European Reassurance Initiative; 2015 budget: 985 US\$ million




❑ European Deterrence Initiative; 2019 budget: 6,531 US\$ million

BSR Security Environment since 2014

Increasing Quality of Deployment: Russia


Problem of Intentions: Modernization, Deterrence or Aggression?



- Replacement of S-200 and S-300 with S-400 (2016-2017, 2019)
- Permanent Deployment (“rearmament”) of Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (2019)
- Formation of a tank battalion with an increased number of tanks (2018)
- A2/AD Capabilities

Source: own compilation based on <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3566812.html>; adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaliningrad#/media/File:Russia_Kaliningrad_location_map.svg.

BSR Security Environment since 2014



Source: adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Sea#/media/File:Baltic_Sea_map.png

Concerns

NATO and partners

- Russian A2/AD capabilities
- Crimea scenario: fait accompli
- “Suwalki Gap”: Problematic Reinforcement in case of conflict
- Air space violations

Russia

- Free access to the Baltic Sea
- Security of Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg
- Aegis Ashore US Missile Defense Base (Redzikowo)
- NATO eFP
- US Patriot missiles and JASSM cruise missiles in Poland

BSR Security Environment since 2014

Mirror Imaging

Russia and NATO perceive themselves as status-quo powers in need of deterrence

Risks of Deterrence Strategies

- Problem of misperceptions: motives, intentions and overall goals;
- Dangerous incidents in the Baltic air space: deterrence and miscommunication;
- Self-fulfilling prophecy: over time deterrent measures that are perceived as threats to one's own security create a security dilemma;
- Assurance masked as deterrence: intra-alliance assurance and solidarity

Alternative: Reassurance Strategies

General Aims

1. Mitigate negative consequences of deterrence
2. Reduce the level of uncertainty about deployment missions
3. Enhance quality of information about force posture and intentions
4. Relax strategic need for deterrence and brinkmanship
5. Provide the foundation for a return to wider security cooperation in the future by establishing trust



Reassurance Strategies: Confidence Building

Vienna document on confidence and security building measures, 2011

- Exchange of information on military forces, structures, deployment, peacetime strength, major weapons and equipment systems, annual military budgets
- Notification and observation of certain military activities (exercises)
- Inspection and evaluation visits
- One airbase visit every five years

Problems

- High thresholds for notification (9000 or more troops) and observations (13,000 or more troops) of military exercises;
- Omission of snap-exercises for regulation (without prior announcement);
- Important capabilities remain unregulated: e.g. naval forces and drones;
- Small passive quotas for inspections;
- Russian position: reform only if the overall security situation changes (NATO deterrence);

Reassurance Strategies: Arms Control

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

BT	ACV	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
40,000	60,000	40,000	13,600	4,000

Status

- Two geopolitical blocs: Failed Adaptation
- Russia suspended implementation in December 2007; full suspension in March 2015
- Since 2012: NATO suspended implementation in relation to Russia

Problems

- Non-members: Baltic States, Finland and Sweden
- High ceilings for military equipment
- Non-regulation of naval forces or air defence systems



Source: <https://fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/intro.htm>.

Outlook I: Reassurance - Confidence Building

Political-Diplomatic


- ❑ **NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997:** “the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement **rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces** [...]”
- ❑ **CFE Final Act 1999:** “**Russian Federation will show due restraint** with regard to ground TLE levels and deployments in the region which includes the **Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast.**”

Legal-Political

- ❑ Extend existing Agreements on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (INCSEAs) and Agreements on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMSs);
- ❑ Baltic Sea Project Team (International Civil Aviation Organization)
- ❑ Re-activate bilateral CSBMs under Chapter X of the Vienna Document: i.e. evaluation visits between Russia and Lithuania;

Outlook II: Reassurance - Arms Control

Baltic Sea Sub-regional Security Regime?



Aim: Minimizing the (technical) ability for rapid mobilization and surprise attack

Conditions:

- Avoid isolation of single states or the establishment of different zones of security
- Accept present deployment levels
- Reiterate political agreements on mutual deployment restraints
- Implement according to Chapter X “Regional Measures” of the Vienna Document

Source: adapted from https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Europe_blank_laea_location_map.svg

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